Following the fall of Goma, the capital of North Kivu Province, speculation about Rwanda’s alleged plans to annex parts of eastern Congo has intensified. Could there be any basis for such claims? Weighed against historical facts, current realities and international power dynamics, the theory simply does not stand up to scrutiny.
Rwanda’s troops were present in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) from 1996 to 2003. At the time, Rwanda had the opportunity to maintain control over the territory held by its allies, the RCD rebels, for instance. The threat posed by the FDLR, an armed group formed by the perpetrators of the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi in Rwanda, was widely acknowledged by global leaders and would have provided a strong justification for Rwanda to establish a presence for as long as the threat lasted. Moreover, the Bush administration was relatively friendly toward Rwanda, unlike the Obama administration that followed.
Despite these favourable conditions, Rwanda opted against establishing a permanent military presence in Eastern Congo. Keen to avoid being seen as an occupying force, it withdrew its troops when a military solution to the FDLR threat became possible. The Pretoria Agreement between Kinshasa and Kigali laid out a framework: the DRC government, with support from the UN peacekeeping mission (MONUC), was to neutralise the FDLR in exchange for withdrawal by Rwanda’s forces. The RCD rebellion, composed largely of Congolese Tutsi fighting to reclaim control over their villages occupied by the FDLR, also agreed to cease hostilities. However, Kinshasa failed to uphold its end of the deal, leading to the CNDP rebellion.
From 2006 to 2009, the CNDP, led by General Laurent Nkunda, also blamed on Rwanda, controlled vast swathes of Congolese territory. If Rwanda had truly harboured the said ambitions to annex territory, this would have been the perfect opportunity. Yet, once again, Kigali refrained from claiming any land. Nor did it encourage the rebels to secede, something which they themselves, had seriously considered. Instead, Rwanda intervened, arrested Nkunda and pushed for a political resolution, resulting in the March 23 Agreement. In return for Rwanda’s cooperation in ending the CNDP rebellion, the then DRC government agreed to conduct joint military operations with Kigali against the FDLR. However, the Obama administration, keen to retain influence in the DRC, undermined this intra-Africa cooperation. The combination of U.S interference and Kinshasa’s failure to integrate former CNDP fighters into the army led to a mutiny: the March 23 Movement (M23), which has now become a well-organised rebellion.
The key takeaway here is that Rwanda had multiple opportunities to leverage Congolese Tutsi grievances for territorial gains, but it repeatedly chose diplomacy over conquest.
Even today, Rwanda continues to advocate for a negotiated political settlement between Kinshasa and the M23 rebels. Kigali has made it clear that dialogue is the only path to normalising relations with Kinshasa. This is hardly the behavior of a state that is intent on annexing its neighbour’s territory. Nevertheless, various actors, Congolese and foreign, pushing conspiracy theories which are now amplified by Western media, continue to ignore these facts.
Beyond historical precedent, the idea of Rwanda annexing eastern Congo is implausible due to the broader international landscape. Unlike Russia, Rwanda is not a nuclear power capable of imposing a territorial fait accompli. Nor does it enjoy unconditional U.S. backing, as Israel does. Additionally, Rwanda would face strong opposition from regional organisations, including the African Union (AU), the East African Community (EAC), and the Southern African Development Community (SADC), all of which count the DRC as a member. Simply put, there is no realistic pathway for Rwanda to annex Congolese territory.
At most, M23-controlled areas could negotiate for autonomy within a federal Congolese framework. Even if such an arrangement were reached, assuming Rwanda would wield unchecked influence over an M23-administered region, which is hardly guaranteed, the notion that it would seek to annex Congo’s territory is misguided. History shows that any heavy-handed interference from Kigali could eventually trigger tensions between Rwanda and M23 leaders, potentially leading to conflict. The people of eastern Congo must take ownership of their own political and security challenges. Of course, cooperation between regional actors is necessary, especially given eastern Congo’s deep economic ties with Rwanda, Uganda, Tanzania, and Burundi. However, it is far-fetched to assume that autonomy for M23-controlled areas would mean subservience to Kigali. If M23 leaders were to be seen as mere puppets of Kigali, their political legitimacy would gradually crumble.
Ultimately, claims that Rwanda harbours ambitions of annexing parts of Congo are not grounded in reality; they are echoes of genocidal propaganda. The myth of a so-called “Hima-Tutsi empire” portrays Tutsi populations as invaders bent on conquest, oppression, and pillage, an insidious narrative that is used to justify anti-Tutsi violence, which serves only to invite counter-violence. Today, Kinshasa’s efforts to rally a so-called “Bantu alliance” against supposed “Nilotic invaders” dangerously mirror past attempts to dehumanise and scapegoat Tutsi communities.
Spreading these conspiracy theories plays directly into the hands of genocidal actors. Those who push such narratives must recognise the historical consequences of inciting ethnic hatred. Rather than entertaining baseless accusations, the international community should focus on fostering dialogue and finding sustainable solutions to the conflict in eastern Congo.
