Historically, Africa has been the focus of external powers seeking to exploit its wealth. Since the Berlin Conference in the late 19th century, the impact of foreign invasion has been profound and lasting. Today, the race to control Africa’s resources and influence its development continues. Global powers such as China, the United States and the European Union, as well as emerging investors such as the United Arab Emirates (UAE), are heavily involved in Africa, often prioritising their strategic interests to benefit from Africa. Despite these external pressures, Africa is at a pivotal moment. With a projected population of 2.5 billion by 2050, a significant proportion of the world’s youth, and vast reserves of minerals, arable land and renewable resources, the continent has unparalleled potential. But these resources are finite, and unless Africans take ownership of their continent and prioritise their interests, they will lose out again, perhaps forever.
Setting Africa’s agenda right
It is unacceptable to see African leaders, some of whom barely able to walk due to old age, like US President Biden, flocking to the so-called ‘Plus One Africa’ summits in China, Russia, the US, India, Turkey, Saudi Arabia and most recently Korea, where the agenda and interests are set by the inviting countries. This subservience continues despite occasional acknowledgement by the Chairperson of the African Union Commission, Moussa Faki Mahamat, that African countries would have preferred prior consultation before setting the agenda of summits and criticised the frequent failure to deliver on promises made during such summits.
For instance, the Italy-Africa summit in January 2024 aimed to stem migration to Western countries by creating job opportunities for African youth in their home countries. Italy pledged €5.5 billion to support climate adaptation and clean energy initiatives in Africa, as part of its contribution to achieving this aim.
The recent Korea-Africa summit was aimed at securing critical mineral resources for South Korea. In 2023, South Korea was dependent on China for 25 of the 33 “strategic minerals” that are crucial to its high-tech industry. To mitigate geopolitical risks and reduce dependence on China, Seoul is actively seeking to establish direct ties with African countries for these essential resources.
After China, Europe and the US, the UAE has become the fourth largest investor in Africa, and the UAE is emerging as Africa’s largest provider of FDI, with $59.4 billion flowing into key sectors such as infrastructure and energy. Although the UAE has not hosted an Africa summit, its investments and tentacles are all over the continent. Most of the gold produced in Africa is smuggled to Dubai. The UAE is buying or acquiring long-term leases in African ports, as DP World, the Emirati multinational logistics company, operates or is about to operate ports in Africa at Djazair and Sokhna in the north, Berbera and Bossaso in the east, Maputo in the south and Banana in the south-west, and Dakar and Ndayane in the west. The UAE provides VIP planes for African leaders and is even accused of supporting rebellions, such Halifa Hafter in Libya and RSF in Sudan, although the UAE has denied any involvement in the war in Sudan and any wrongdoing.
Turkey, for its part, is alleged to be paying Syrian mercenaries to provide security at Turkish-run gold mines and factories in Burkina Faso, Niger and Nigeria, without even using African security firms.
All these examples raise the question: what does Africa gain from its interactions with the outside world? Or rather, do Africa’s gains outweigh its losses in these unequal relationships? And what does history teach us?
A history of plunder and aggression
Based on a recent study analysing almost two centuries of meticulous tax and trade data, it is estimated that between 1765 and 1938, Britain extracted around $45 trillion from India alone. To put this staggering figure into perspective, it is 17 times greater than the UK’s entire annual gross domestic product in 2018. Reflecting on this history, a Sudanese acquaintance of mine, Al Taib Zerug, shared his experience of walking the streets of London on his first visit in 1989, feeling a sense of entitlement to the city’s development because of the wealth contributed by his homeland. It’s uncertain how he would feel today, given Britain’s reluctance to accept asylum seekers, many from its former colonies, opting instead to process their claims in Africa. What would he make of other studies, such as one by a free-market think-tank, which claimed that Britain had not benefited much from its colonies – a claim welcomed by the UK’s former business and trade secretary, Kemi Badenoch.
The exploitation of the Congo colony by King Leopold of Belgium is another egregious example, which is estimated to have netted him a fortune in excess of $1 billion in today’s currency. This wealth was acquired through unspeakable atrocities, including torture, rape, murder and the decimation of the Congolese population, particularly through the brutal practices of rubber extraction.
Equally shocking is Britain’s historic coercion of China to buy opium, a tactic designed to promote addiction and social disruption to weaken the nation. Opium grown in British-controlled territories such as India was illegally diverted to China. When the Chinese government seized and destroyed British opium shipments in 1839, Britain responded with military aggression, sparking what became known as the Opium Wars. In some ways, this is analogous to modern US restrictions on China’s access to chip technology for artificial intelligence (AI) and other critical technological tools, and its support for a rebellious Taiwan, which, along with Western involvement in Ukraine, is pushing the world closer to a confrontation between nuclear-armed superpowers.
Given this history, Africans must ask themselves: Why can’t China and Russia develop like Western countries? Isn’t that in the interest of humanity as a whole? And if China and Russia, two big and powerful nations, can be the target of such aggressive policies, what should be the lessons for disunited, weak individual African states dealing with world powers?
A needed introspection
There is no doubt that investment opportunities can emerge from these summits. However, the first lesson to learn from the history of the West’s relationships with the rest of the world is the value of unity. In this regard, Africa can learn a lot from countries like South Korea, which transformed itself from an underdeveloped Japanese colony that gained independence in 1945 to one of the world’s leading economies today. South Korea’s development path has been characterised by strategic government policies, investment in education, research and human capital, export-led industrialisation, technological innovation and the rise of powerful conglomerates. Despite facing significant challenges, including the Korean War and the Asian financial crisis, South Korea’s ability to adapt and implement effective reforms has allowed it to emerge as a leading global economy. The unity of South Koreans has been the bedrock of these reforms.
But there are 54 countries in Africa, many of which struggle with the concept of unity domestically, regionally, and on the continental level. These countries are very diverse economically, politically and in terms of their interests, and each of them is trying to make its own deals with the summit hosts. There is no evidence that this approach can help African countries assert their collective interests.
It is true that despite these challenges, Africa is trying to assert itself on the world stage. The African Union (AU) is a member of the G-20, albeit a small one and is also seeking a permanent seat on the UN Security Council. But for the AU to set African priorities right during these Plus One Africa summits, play a key role in negotiating trade agreements and overseeing joint infrastructure efforts, there must be a unified African voice at these summits.
The other lesson that Africans can learn from world history is the critical need to diversify our economies away from commodity dependence towards investment in high-value, knowledge-based industries. This includes focusing on education, developing sustainable energy, investing in research and development, fostering innovation ecosystems and promoting sectors such as technology, advanced manufacturing and the use of artificial intelligence.
A good place to start in the current digital transformation of African economies is improving access to the internet. In 2013, there were 650 million mobile phone users in Africa, more than in the United States or Europe. By the end of 2023, there will be about 435 million active mobile money accounts – an annual growth of 9%, compared to 13% in 2022 and 15% in 2021. Unfortunately, only 37% of users have access to the internet. This digital transformation is reshaping African economies, but its benefits will be limited by internet access. In a context where nine of the world’s twenty fastest-growing economies in 2024 are in Africa (Niger, Senegal, Libya, Rwanda, Côte d’Ivoire, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Gambia and Benin), the issue of low internet access needs to be dealt with urgently. Otherwise, the transformation will remain stunted, and 20 years from now, people will wonder what happened to the “Africa is rising” mantra.
Moreover, in order to build our economic growth on a sustainable foundation, we also need to address governance, social conflicts and environmental degradation. Economist Branko Milanovic argues that Africa’s inability to sustain even modest growth rates over long periods of time seems to be the main problem. He adds that fluctuations in growth are driven by political conflicts, civil wars, and cyclical price trends that affect the natural resources on which much of Africa’s production and exports are based. Failure to address these challenges head-on means that Africa will be for sale again, and its future generations will be deprived of the benefits of resources that are not infinite.
It is worth repeating that Africa’s natural resources mainly benefit global corporations and foreign powers. To some extent, they have become a curse for African countries as they have been unable to foster cohesive and united societies. In many of these countries, even the small benefits derived from the exploitation of natural resources have not trickled down to the masses.
This begs the question: How long can Africa pretend to assert itself on the world stage while ignoring the internal contradictions that undermine its position vis-à-vis world powers and multinational corporations?
