On November 1, 2024, the Chief Justice and President of the Supreme Court of Kenya, according to the law, swore in the legal scholar, Abraham Kithure Kindiki, as Kenya’s third Deputy President. This marked the final exit from the helm of power of former Deputy President Geoffrey Rigathi Gachagua whose peaceful and lawful removal from office by impeachment on October 17, 2024—the first of its kind and a rare feat in Africa—tested Kenya’s democracy in a visible and public way.
The Gachagua impeachment had both political and legal elements. In this context, impeachment is ‘lawfare’. Simply put, this is a strategy where the law is weaponized in parliament, courts and media— the ‘court of public opinion’—to achieve political victory. The Kenyan elite has resorted to the use of the legal path to deal with political differences and fallouts. This way, the country has escaped the ‘curse of Vice Presidents’ where broken relationships and power tussles between incumbent presidents and their deputies have triggered civil wars and state failure in South Sudan and Sudan and paralysed politics in South Africa. But the impeachment drama has left a badly divided nation, radicalised sections of the population and an intense re-tribalisation of politics ahead of the 2027 elections.
It’s the politics, stupid
The Gachagua trial revealed the Janus-faced phenomenon of impeachment, which uniquely has both legal and political faces. Primarily, impeachment is a last resort in law to safeguard democracy from an unhinged executive branch. In this sense, impeachment is a handmaid of democracy.
At the same time, it would be extremely naive to see the Gachagua impeachment as simply a “matter of law”. “Impeachment,” writes Albert Broderick, “is a political rather than a legal process.” Gachagua’s impeachment was triggered by his irredeemably broken relationship with President William Samoei Ruto, who publicly accused him of funding and fuelling the GenZ revolt. On his part, Gachagua publicly criticised the National Intelligence Service (NIS) for failing to foresee the unrest. On 20 September 2024, he outlined the extent of the rift, accusing Ruto’s advisers and ministers of systematically undermining his authority.
What followed, however, is a perfect case of lawfare, hailed as “the newest feature of 21st century combat strategy”. Both sides of the political divide actively weaponised parliament, the Court and the media (the “court of public opinion”) to achieve their political victory. For Ruto, it was to get rid of a disloyal deputy; for Gachagua, it was to stay in power. The impeachment was President Ruto’s response to a widening rift with his deputy, which reached a breaking point in the wake of the GenZ protests in the June-July winter. The President formed a new alliance with opposition leader Raila Odinga and his Orange Democratic Movement (ODM), appointing four ministers from Odinga’s party to the ‘broad-based government’. In the short term, this alliance was a means of marshalling the numbers of MPs and senators that Ruto needed to oust his renegade deputy. It was also a strategy to divert attention from the GenZ protests and stabilise the polity. If it holds together, the Board-based alliance could possibly be a winning platform in President Ruto’s 2027 re-election bid.
In both the National Assembly and the Senate, the impeachment was a blitzkrieg launched to give Ruto a swift victory. The 11-count impeachment motion was tabled in the National Assembly on 1 October. A week later, on 8 October, a total of 281 MPs voted in favour of Gachagua’s impeachment. A two-day trial on 16 and 17 October 2024 sealed Gachagua’s fate by finding him guilty of five of the 11 charges.
The impeachment moved lawfare to a whole new level. Outnumbered and out-gunned in the National Assembly and Senate, Gachagua resorted to both the court of law and the court of public opinion (media) to fight his removal from power. He assembled a powerful team of lawyers to defend him against what he described as “political lynching.” When Senate voted to oust him on October 17, 2024, Gachagua went to the Hight Court to challenge both his impeachment and the appointment of his successor. The Court gave orders barring his removal from office and replacement on October 18, 2024. But on October 23, 2024, the court declined to extend the conservatory orders. This cleared the way for the swearing in of a new Deputy President on November 1, 2024.
After parliament and the court, the remaining space for lawfare is the court of public opinion—described as “the most important informal court” that entails the use of the media to win public support. Lawfare shot to new heights after Gachagua’s hospitalization for chest pains, Senate’s rejection of the proposal by his lawyers to adjourn the trial for two days and the final vote to impeach him on October 17. Upon being discharge from hospital, he addressed the media, stating that his security details had been withdrawn, alleging that on two occasions government agents had tried to poison him, and accused President Ruto of using impeachment as “a political game… to get rid of me”.
The wheel of democracy in Kenya is turning slowly. But the impeachment debate in the public sphere has turned a sharp spotlight on the quality of this democracy. Voters who are not well-informed or equipped with knowledge, we now know, makes democracy a dangerous gamble. Far from electing the best and ablest to offices, Kenya’s voters elect into office crooks, cranks, charlatans and demagogues with the gift of the gab. Failure to adhere to meritocracy means that power remains in the hands of irredeemably corrupt, self-seeking and inefficient demagogues—a genre of populist leaders who thrive on prejudices, false promises, and charisma to manipulate voters and win power.
The impeachment process has raised questions about the stability and future of democracy. On 4 October alone, a total of 22 demonstrations took place during public participation exercises to gauge citizens’ views on the 11 charges. 18 of these demonstrations were openly in support of the Vice-President. Although the government blamed Gachagua and his allies for inciting some of the unrest, the protests revealed his nationwide network of supporters with the capacity to generate widespread and potentially sustained unrest. They also highlight Kenya’s fragility.
This may be the end of the road for Gachagua in the corridors of power, but not his influence. His lawfare strategy is likely to continue with the aim of greatly damaging the reputation of parliament and erasing President Ruto’s footprint in the populous Mount Kenya region ahead of the 2027 elections. The big question remains: will Gachagua succeed in turning his impeachment into a referendum issue that will enable him to return to power in 2027? The jury is out.
