In April 2024, more than 80 political parties and civil society groups in Mali issued two joint public statements calling for a presidential election “as soon as possible” and an end to the transitional military rule of Colonel Assimi Goita, which began after his coup in 2021. One of the statements called on the transitional government “to create the conditions for a rapid and inclusive dialogue, for the establishment of an institutional architecture and with immediate effect organise a presidential election”.
On the surface, this appeared to be a perfectly reasonable and legitimate demand, especially given that the Goita regime’s self-imposed timeline for a transition back to an elected government had expired on 26 March. As had happened so many times before in Africa, the military government would conduct elections, hand over power to the newly elected government, and return to the barracks to live happily ever after. This time, however, the unique circumstances surrounding Mali’s transitional government make the situation much more complicated. A different approach is needed to address Mali’s challenges.
Elections – And then what?
A useful way of analysing the situation in Mali, and in other African countries going through similar transitional periods following anti-colonial actions, is to attempt to look forward and project a likely scenario. Let’s say, for example, that the Malian government were to announce a presidential election for February next year, based solely on the demands of these groups. The first and most immediate effect of this would be that, as is typical in Africa, all meaningful governance would grind to a halt for the next six months as election campaigns take priority over everything.
The fact that Mali is very much at war with a suspiciously well-armed insurgent enemy, and that the Malian military has still not fully regained control of the country’s entire landmass, would quickly be forgotten in the hubbub. After all, the only job metric of a political candidate is how many more votes they can score than their opponent. Whether voter turnout is 35 per cent because of a bad security situation or 75 per cent because of an improved security situation is of no concern to politicians. They are only concerned about one thing – did they beat their opponent?
After “winning” with a majority of votes from a minority of voters due to the unresolved security situation, our friend the newly “elected” President of Mali finds himself in office – completely unprepared for the level of upheaval he has to deal with. Remember, this is a country that is dealing not only with a security emergency, but also with a complete reordering of its economy and basic business model. From being just another stagnant French vassal, with no significant economic or foreign policy decisions being made in Bamako, as it was three years ago, Mali is now a founding member of the Sahel Alliance and dealing with all the unfamiliar challenges of actual sovereignty.
Its international trade relations, diplomatic alignments, monetary system, fiscal policy, language policy, civil service, education system and just about every major aspect of Mali’s governance and public life are undergoing, in the span of weeks and months, the sort of once-in-a-century shift that normally takes a decade to execute. In the midst of all this upheaval, the only institution that has successfully managed enough of its own transition to hold itself together and provide some sort of direction for the country is the military.
No longer in power, the military now sits back and watches from the barracks as the “elected president” fumbles and stumbles through an unfamiliar landscape, without the hand-holding from Paris to which Mali’s leaders were once accustomed. Eventually, after a year of trying to wing his way through the presidency, something gives. The president tries to introduce an unpopular policy and the people pour into the streets in rage. He orders the military to put down the rioters, and the military intervenes – but not the way he wants. The president is toppled in a bloodless coup, and martial music plays on the radio. Congratulations, we made it to 2026, only to end up right back where we started in 2022.
Elections are a means – Not an end
Three years ago, I would have balked at the suggestion that a military regime might, in some circumstances, be a superior option to an elected civilian government. My understanding then was that military rule of any kind was something to be avoided at all costs. Since then, I have had the unfortunate honour of experiencing no less than four elections that have disabused me of any notions I once had about the inherent sanctity of African electoral processes and the motivations of the foreign actors involved in those processes.
It is now my considered position that elections in and of themselves do not address the real issues of quality of governance and state capacity, nor do they represent ‘democracy’. In a country where large sections of the civilian population are still haunted by the protracted failure of the infamous Operation Barkhane – in which French troops, supposedly fighting Islamist insurgents, prevented Malian troops from accessing parts of the country for years – does organising a premature election to satisfy a group of politicians and foreign-funded civil society actors actually improve the lives of the people?
The reality is that France has for many decades exerted such overwhelming control over the local politics of Mali and other Sahelian countries that the mere fact of running these countries as the newly sovereign entities they now are poses a significant challenge to their totally unprepared political classes. Under these circumstances, holding a presidential election for its own sake, and ending up with an “elected president” who is incapable of dealing with the challenge he faces, can only lead either to a return to the pre-coup status quo of French domination, or to the post-coup status quo of military rule.
Either scenario would have left the fundamental questions of governance in Mali unanswered, which is why the transitional government must not hold an election to tick an arbitrary set of boxes, but instead communicate regularly about what the real issues are. Malians must be made to understand that the transitional government is working on fundamental issues inherent to a newly sovereign country in the world’s youngest supranational regional union. Malians must be made to understand that the transitional government is working on fundamental issues inherent to a newly sovereign country in the world’s youngest supranational regional union. It must be explained to the public in Mali and other countries in similar circumstances that their real problems – basic state formation, institution building and the development of an economic model in line with the broader regional economic strategies of the AES and the AU – are not problems that an election will solve.
The unpleasant, unvarnished reality is that Mali’s foundations have been fundamentally damaged by decades of insurgency, and the military, as the strongest institution left in the country, needs to successfully establish a security and economic base before relinquishing power. Only then should elections be held, because Malian elections should exist because of Malian lives, not the other way around.
