The recent postponement of the Luanda Summit of Heads of State, which was supposed to culminate in a comprehensive agreement to normalise relations between the DRC and Rwanda, has fuelled speculations that the Luanda process is collapsing. What should not be lost sight of, however, is that Kinshasa’s latest attempt to sidestep regional pressure for a negotiated solution to the M23 crisis has given a second life to the very EAC-led Nairobi process that Kinshasa sought to effectively bury. That wasn’t Tshisekedi’s plan. Quite the opposite.
Tshisekedi running around in circles
Since the M23 crisis began in late 2021, Kinshasa’s objectives have been fairly straightforward. Defeat the M23 militarily, claim victory over Rwanda, the country the Congolese political elite love to hate and, if circumstances allow, march on to Kigali itself. In the belief that these goals were achievable, Kinshasa excluded M23 from the EAC-led Nairobi peace process, enlisted into the fight all the armed groups (including the FDLR) that Tshisekedi had promised to disarm when he declared martial law in North Kivu and Ituri provinces, expelled the EAC forces that had refused to support his war plans, and brought in European mercenaries, SADC and Burundian troops. Clearly, the shutting down of the Nairobi process was the first step towards a replay of the 2012-2013 scenario, with M23 pushed out of Congolese territory, while regime change in Kigali was seen as the icing on the cake. But nothing has gone according to plan, and some would argue that none of all this was ever going to go according to plan.
First, Rwanda acted decisively in response to the bombing of its territory and to the threats made in public by Congolese officials. Its defensive measures, whatever they may be, have forced Kinshasa to seemingly capitulate and agree to neutralise the FDLR. It was important for Kigali to seal Tshisekedi’s commitment on paper. Holding him to his promises is an entirely different matter.
Second, the M23 rebels have extended their control over large swathes of Congolese territory. While the SADC troops are not neutral, they now appear to be reluctant to engage M23 militarily.
Finally, it is becoming increasingly difficult to ignore reports that hundreds of thousands of Congolese have returned to their homes in rebel-held areas, a fact that contradicts Kinshasa’s mirror accusations that the M23 are bloodthirsty killers that are hell-bent on cleansing North Kivu of its indigenous population. As a result, the prospect of direct talks with M23, which Kinshasa had tried to bury along with the Nairobi process, is resurfacing, this time as part of the Luanda process.
So, when in a diplomatic stunt orchestrated for maximum effect, Tshisekedi flew to Luanda knowing in advance that the summit of heads of state had been postponed, he was in for a surprise. While his aim was to show the world that he was ready to make peace and that Rwanda, which he portrays as a “regional troublemaker”, was the stumbling block to a peaceful resolution of the conflict, he found himself discussing with João Lourenço and Uhuru Kenyatta, the two African mediators, the one issue he didn’t want on the table: talks with M23.
Rwanda vindicated
The presence in Angola of Uhuru Kenyatta, the EAC-appointed facilitator of the Nairobi process, is yet another indication that President João Lourenço is carefully manoeuvring to bring the two processes together. The move follows several meetings between the Angolan mediator and M23 representatives, as well as an August proposal by the mediator to resolve the M23 issue through the Luanda process. Most importantly, Lourenço’s approach vindicates Rwanda’s position as expressed by President Kagame in an interview with Jeune Afrique in May 2024. Kagame was clear during the interview: “I would have wished that we bring these processes closer together instead of running them separately or sometimes in different directions”.
Lourenço’s move, if backed up by further action, would put an end to Kinshasa’s delaying tactics. In a context where Kigali maintains that dialogue between the DRC government and the M23 rebels remain a key precondition for the normalisation of relations with Kinshasa, and Congo’s foreign minister insists that the M23 issue can only be discussed in the framework of the Nairobi process, bringing the two processes together reconciles the two positions.
Moreover, whether one believes that M23 is made up of Rwandans invading Congo, as Congolese officials claim in their hate speeches, or that they are Congolese rebels backed by Rwanda, as Western powers and their media and ‘human rights groups’ claim, the only forum that will address all these allegations in a focused way is one that brings the three parties to the same table. Bringing the two processes together creates that forum.
There is no doubt that President Lourenço will have to contend with the many contradictions within the DRC government. For example, when the Congolese foreign minister referred the M23 issue to Nairobi, de facto conceding the possibility of direct talks between Kinshasa and the rebels, the presidency issued its own statement reminding everyone that the government considers M23 to be a terrorist group and suggesting that President Tshisekedi would never agree to negotiate with the rebels.
Hopefully, President Lourenço will stick to the pragmatic path. He knows that Tshisekedi, for all his chest thumping, does not have the means to defeat M23. Indeed, while the presidency was drafting its bellicose and defiant statement, the Congolese army was fleeing from M23 again, this time in the Lubero region.
Tshisekedi may be delaying the political backlash of being seen to make concessions to Rwanda. Military defeats by M23, however, will have the same effect on his so far uninspiring political career. Soon enough even his staunchest supporters will realise that he is back to square one, facing the same pressure from Luanda that he faced from Nairobi, to talk to the M23.
