The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), a nation of 2.3 million square kilometres and over 450 ethnic groups, is no stranger to political upheaval, but the return of former President Joseph Kabila to Goma on 26 May 2025 has upended conventional narratives about its ongoing crisis.
Many mainstream accounts, from Kinshasa to Western capitals, portray Kabila as a disgraced ex-leader, a pawn of the M23 rebels, or a traitor colluding with Rwanda to fracture the DRC further. This view, however, misses a deeper reality. First, Kabila is quite unpopular, and is even loathed, by M23 supporters and by some countries in the region. Then, his return, or at least elements of it, seem not to be mere opportunism but a calculated move that exposes the fragility of Kinshasa’s centralised authority and forces a reckoning on whether the DRC’s colonial-era state model can endure.
Far from being a “useful idiot,” Kabila’s presence in rebel-held territory challenges the fiction of a unified DRC, potentially amplifies calls for federalism, and reframes the M23 rebellion as a symptom of Congolese dysfunction. Kabila’s gambit—flawed and divisive as it might be to some —may inadvertently pave the way for a reimagined DRC, where decentralisation triumphs over a failing central state.
Kabila’s Return: A Strategic Pivot
On 26 May 2025, Joseph Kabila, president from 2001 to 2019, returned to the DRC, landing in Goma, a city controlled by M23 since January 2025. Welcomed by Corneille Nangaa, head of the Congo River Alliance (AFC), M23’s political wing and a former ally, Kabila’s return followed the DRC Senate’s decision on 23 May 2025 to strip him of parliamentary immunity, citing charges of treason and war crimes for alleged M23 ties. In a 45-minute YouTube speech on 24 May, Kabila denounced Tshisekedi’s “dictatorship” and proposed a 12-point peace plan, positioning himself as a mediator. On 29 May, he met religious and community leaders at his Kinyogote residence in Goma, signaling a push for peace talks.
Kinshasa, led by President Felix Tshisekedi, accuses Kabila of aligning with M23 to destabilise the DRC, with Tshisekedi’s party claiming he is a “Rwandan subject” leading the rebels. Kabila denies these ties, but a member of his entourage told AFP that he and M23 share the goal of ending Tshisekedi’s rule, suggesting a tactical alignment.
Born in South Kivu and heir to his father Laurent Kabila’s legacy in Katanga and Tanganyika, Kabila is no rebel stooge. His return to Goma, 1,600 kilometres from Kinshasa, taps into the east’s alienation from a capital that extracts its coltan, cobalt, and gold while neglecting its infrastructure. Like the M23 rebellion, his move raises a critical question: is the DRC’s centralised state still viable?
The M23 Paradox: From Foe to Ally
Kabila’s alignment (or accommodation) with M23 requires some historical context. In 2012, M23, formed from defectors of the Congolese army (FARDC) and rooted in the National Congress for the Defence of the People (CNDP), seized Goma, citing Kinshasa’s failure to honour the 2009 peace deal. Kabila’s government, with MONUSCO support, defeated M23 in 2013, leading to the Nairobi Declarations.
However, unresolved grievances—ethnic marginalisation and disposession of Congolese Tutsis, poor military integration, and Kinshasa’s neglect—fueled M23’s resurgence in 2021. Tshisekedi’s accusations of Kabila’s M23 ties stem partly from Nangaa’s role as Kabila’s former electoral commission chief. Kabila’s failure to address root causes enabled M23’s revival, and his current presence in Goma reflects pragmatism, as noted by Al Jazeera.
M23’s legitimacy is bolstered by Kabila’s presence, recasting the group as a domestic movement rather than a Rwandan proxy its critics claim it is, and also as less of a Congolese Tutsi grievance vehicle. This shifts Tshisekedi’s narrative, which blames Rwanda’s support for the rebellion. Kabila’s alignment, as analyst Hubert Masomeko notes, creates a “dangerous standoff,” suggesting a bet on a federalist future where regions like Kivu and Katanga gain autonomy.
Economic and Social Toll: Kinshasa’s Decline
M23’s control of Goma and Bukavu, seized in January and February 2025, has crippled Kinshasa’s economic hold. The east accounts for 60% of DRC’s mineral exports, including 70% of global cobalt. In 2024, the DRC’s mining sector generated US$6.8 billion, with North and South Kivu contributing US$4 billion. M23’s parallel administration, taxing locals and controlling mines like Rubaya’s coltan fields, on paper diverts an estimated US$1.2 billion annually from Kinshasa according to Global Witness. The Goma-Gisenyi border, previously facilitating US$500 million in trade, is now under M23, slashing Kinshasa’s customs revenue. With a 23% inflation rate and a 40% drop in cobalt revenue in 2024, Kinshasa faces fiscal collapse.
Socially, the east is in crisis. Millions are still displaced. M23’s governance, while hamfisted, offers order, such as traffic management at Goma’s Birere Market. Kinshasa’s neglect, with Kivu’s 73% poverty rate versus 64% nationally, has ceded legitimacy to rebels. M23 is repairing and building roads, and electricity supply in the Kivus is reported to be more stable than it used to be. Their repairs for mineral transport outstrip Kinshasa’s efforts.
Historical Roots: A Colonial Legacy
The DRC’s crisis partly stems from its colonial origins. Under Belgium’s King Leopold II, the Congo Free State (1885–1908) was an extractive regime, killing millions while plundering rubber and ivory.
Independence in 1960 inherited a fragmented state, its centralised model designed to funnel wealth to Kinshasa. The east, rich but neglected, has been a flashpoint since the 1960s, when Patrice Lumumba clashed with regionalists like Moise Tshombe.
Kabila’s South Kivu roots and his father’s Katanga legacy, as noted by commentators, position him to revive federalist ideas. M23’s parallel state, however problematic, proves local governance can function where Kinshasa fails.
Minerals and Power
The DRC’s cobalt and lithium make it central to the global green energy race. Tshisekedi’s April 2025 offer of mining concessions for U.S. support, aims to counter M23 but risks deepening dependency. The deal’s prospects are uncertain; the Donald Trump administration, skeptical of Tshisekedi, may hesitate, with M23 controlling mines. Only 12% of mining revenues were reinvested locally in 2024, highlighting the DRC’s resource-colony status.
Kabila’s presence could also complicates Qatar-mediated talks, as M23 may demand more concessions. Kabila, once a U.S. ally, now threatens Washington’s mineral ambitions by aligning his interests with rebels.
Tshisekedi’s Precarious Position
Tshisekedi faces dire risks. Losing more territory—potentially toward Kisangani, 400 kilometres from mineral-critical Walikale (from where M23 withdrew in March after seizing in order to enable a diplomatic solution) could reduce him to president of Kinshasa alone. Elites are planning exits, and coup rumors persist. Economic losses, with a 23% inflation rate and 40% cobalt revenue drop, threaten collapse.
Rising anti-Tutsi hate speech and millions displaced risk unrest akin to 2018 protests. Tshisekedi’s defiance, may not withstand a military or popular uprising if it came.
A functional DRC might require an overhaul of centralisation. A federal system, granting provinces like Kivu and Katanga 40% of resources revenues and regional security forces, could address grievances while preserving unity. Kabila’s return shines a spotlight on the east’s autonomy demands, though he might not have intended it.
Strong institutions, dealing with marginalisation and hate speech, dealing with the FDLR (a genocidal group based in eastern DR Congo for close to three decades, and formed by the masterminds of the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi in Rwanda). and transparent revenue sharing are critical, though the DRC’s patronage history poses challenges. M23’s governance, however flawed, shows local control’s potential.
Kabila may fail, but his presence forces a question: can the DRC transcend its past to build a state for all, or will it fracture? The answer lies not in Kinshasa’s fading grip but in the east’s defiant reality.
