Since the signing of a US-engineered peace deal between Rwanda and the DRC, debate has been swirling over whether the economic dimension of the agreement is in Congo’s favour, or whether the country’s mineral wealth is once again being sold off. The trouble is that much of this debate lacks context. The details of a mineral deal, still to be signed between Kinshasa and Washington, remain unknown. Much of the commentary is therefore merely speculative. That does not mean, however, that we cannot already anticipate the risks ahead for the Congolese people, or how they might be shut out from the potential benefits of such a deal, if any. And if we were to be honest, the outlook is not encouraging.
Clarity matters
Before unpacking why the future looks uncertain, it is important to clarify that the agreement signed between Rwanda and Congo was not a mineral deal per se. Rather, it was a framework for regional cooperation, one that would allow some Congolese minerals to be refined in Rwanda before being exported to the United States. The idea behind that framework is not new: such a cooperation would support peace efforts as both countries stand to gain more from economic collaboration than from conflict.
Naturally, those who see the war as an act of Rwanda’s aggression are not pleased. From their perspective, the arrangement rewards the aggressor. But that argument does not really hold water. There is a credible case to be made that Congo has, at times, sought to destabilise Rwanda by backing a genocidal group bent on toppling the RPF-led government in Kigali. At other times, it has armed the FDLR to fight internal rebellions, with little regard for the security threat that helping build up its combat capabilities posed to Rwanda. These actions invalidate the sweeping claims that Congo is necessarily the victim and Rwanda the aggressor.
But beyond the endless debates over who is to blame for the current conflict, we should remember that even in times of peace, significant quantities of minerals leaving Congo transit through its neighbours, including Rwanda, en route to refineries in South Africa, China, Canada, Belgium, Switzerland, Australia, and elsewhere. This implies two things.
First, in the current context, refining DRC-sourced minerals in Rwanda does not rob Congolese operators of anything. Quite the opposite. It helps cut transport costs by allowing minerals to be processed closer to where they are extracted, before being shipped further abroad. What it threatens, however, are the interests of established refiners in places like South Africa and Belgium. Rwanda’s entry into the value chain brings competition, and that is likely why South Africa and Belgium are heavily involved in the conflict, knowingly siding with the wrong crowd.
Second, Rwanda does not need US involvement to make regional economic integration work. What it needs is peace, good relations with the DRC, and adequate refining capacity. The US can support peace efforts, but Rwanda already offers a conducive business environment: safety for operators, low taxes, and minimal corruption. In such conditions, Congolese operators, like any rational businesses, would naturally gravitate towards Rwanda, where returns are higher, regardless of whether a US trade deal is in place.
So the relevant question for the Congolese should not be why under the US-brokered agreement, some of their minerals would be refined in Rwanda. Rather, it should be why, after all these years, their own country still has very little refining capacity. If Rwanda had not stepped in, it would simply have been someone else. And either way, the Congolese would still be missing out on the economic gains of the refining business.
Why the odds are not good for Congo
In principle, there is nothing inherently wrong with doing business with the US or any other foreign power, for that matter. But context matters. In this case, Africans, and the Congolese people in particular, are right to be concerned, because the circumstances in which the highly publicised mineral deal is set to be signed are far from ideal.
To start with the obvious, there is a serious imbalance in power between the US and the DRC. That alone should raise concerns. In a peaceful regional context, a stable Congo and its neighbour, Rwanda, could have strategised together on how to negotiate with the US and come up with a joint proposal. This would have brought some degree of bargaining power to the table. But that is not what happened. The US negotiated separately with each country and will likely walk away with the best deal.
For Rwanda, the calculus is less complicated. As long as the country generates profit on its investment in refining capacity, it will consider any mineral deal a success. For Congo, however, the lack of negotiating power means the chances are slim that the deal will include strong resettlement plans for displaced communities or environmental safeguards. It is also unclear whether, beyond extraction, US operators will be required to establish any refining capacity inside Congo itself.
To make matters worse, the DRC is at war. So far, it has been on the back foot, which means it is negotiating from a position of weakness, if not desperation. The government has lost control over some of the very mineral-rich areas it claims to be negotiating over and is now fighting for its political survival. With Kinshasa focused primarily on securing military support and acquiring sophisticated weaponry, any mineral deal it signs is likely to sidestep all the demands a peaceful country would make. Clearly, Congo should have made peace with its rebels before entering into any mineral negotiation with the US.
To add to the conundrum, the endemic corruption at the highest levels of government in the DRC makes the prospect of a good deal unlikely. Hardly a week goes by without new reports of embezzlement by senior government officials. For example, Vital Kamerhe, the Speaker of the Parliament, is a known offender and former convict. Constant Mutamba, the former Minister of Justice, who resigned recently over allegations of embezzlement, will likely be taking his place behind bars. Belgian newspaper La Libre Belgique has carried credible reporting on the Tshisekedi family’s murky involvement in the mining sector, particularly in the mineral-rich Katanga region, with damning findings. Tshisekedi is said to have been involved in corruption on a scale never seen before. In short, the idea that a political elite draining the country in the middle of a war could be relied upon to defend Congo’s national interest in any negotiation with the US is unrealistic.
Africans need to reflect deeply on the kinds of leadership they choose to support. One may dislike Rwanda, but it is difficult to imagine this sort of debate taking place if a leader like Kagame were leading the DRC. Rwanda can sign any deal it likes, and no one would seriously question whether it serves Rwanda’s interests. That confidence stems from the Rwandan leadership’s standing with Rwandans in general and its consistent defence of the country’s national interests. Congolese leaders have not earned that kind of trust. And that is precisely why this debate is happening in the first place. Only full transparency around the actual deal to be signed between the US and Congo will reveal the extent of the hole Congolese leaders have dug for their own country.
