Last week, Angola’s President João Lourenço proposed a ceasefire between the Congolese government and the AFC/M23 movement, setting 18 February as the date it would take effect. Kinshasa appeared to agree, yet its offensive operations against Minembwe, a rebel stronghold, and its continued drone strikes targeting Banyamulenge civilians and their property have not stopped.
AFC/M23, for its part, while expressing readiness to operationalise the ceasefire monitoring and verification mechanism previously agreed under Qatari mediation, appeared surprised that the proposal came from Luanda rather than Doha. The movement questioned the multiplication of peace tracks and the overlap of processes — a tactic Kinshasa has repeatedly used in the past to delay implementation.
While any truce is welcome from a humanitarian perspective, politically and militarily matters are far more complicated. Here is why.
Irreconcilable political objectives
From a political standpoint, there are at least three major obstacles to a ceasefire.
The first lies in the fundamentally competing objectives of the warring parties. On the back of its battlefield gains, AFC/M23 knows it can drive a hard bargain and, through negotiations, force formal — even if temporary — recognition of its authority over liberated territory. While this falls short of the federalism it advocates, it is the closest approximation to it.
Kinshasa, by contrast, categorically rejects this logical outcome of its military defeats. It portrays AFC/M23 as an extension of the Rwandan military, denies the Congolese citizenship of its members, ignores their legitimate grievances, and demands that the rebellion disappear at the same time as Rwanda lifts its defensive measures. For Kinshasa, there is no internal conflict, only an interstate crisis. Hence the mantra: this is not a rebellion; it is external aggression.
However nihilistic this view may be, and however unrealistic the military option has proven, Kinshasa remains determined to pursue it, hoping that some external intervention — whether by mercenaries or allied states, on the battlefield or diplomatically — will magically make the rebellion vanish.
These competing objectives alone mean that, for now at least, there is no political solution acceptable to both sides, and therefore no incentive to stop fighting.
The second stumbling block concerns the battle over mediation, where it should happen and under whose authority. AFC/M23 is determined to see the Doha process through, believing it has already secured commitments on paper that would have been unthinkable three years ago.
Kinshasa, meanwhile, has begun a gradual disengagement from Doha. Unable to admit this openly for diplomatic reasons, it has signed agreements it does not intend to implement while opening a parallel track in Luanda, which it views as a more friendly actor, in order to offset its weak hand at the negotiating table.
President Félix Tshisekedi appears to believe this allows him to shape the terms of negotiation, given Angola’s shared interest in halting AFC/M23’s advance, which could eventually reach the historically secessionist Katanga region and jeopardise major multilateral, multi-billion-dollar projects such as the Lobito Corridor. And Luanda proposing a ceasefire it discussed solely with Kinshasa does not inspire confidence in its ability to mediate impartially.
These disagreements explain the divergent language surrounding this potential ceasefire. Kinshasa appears to embrace the Luanda proposal while ignoring previous agreements, since acknowledging them would revive the Doha process it seeks to bury. AFC/M23, meanwhile, refers exclusively to Doha, viewing acceptance of Luanda as submitting to a mediator perceived as too close to the enemy.
Under such conditions, how can a genuine ceasefire emerge?
They are not done fighting
From a purely military perspective, the announced ceasefire comes at the worst possible moment for both sides. Kinshasa and AFC/M23 are locked in a battle for control of the highlands around Uvira and Baraka — two lakeside towns that constitute the last relatively secure entry points for Burundian forces into Congo, a key ally of Kinshasa.
Kinshasa has not abandoned hopes of a military victory that could strengthen its position at the negotiating table. As long as it can rely on Burundian, and possibly Tanzanian, reinforcements via Lake Tanganyika, it will be tempted to violate any ceasefire. This, in turn, pushes AFC/M23 to press its advantage, cut off those supply routes by taking or fully encircling the coastal cities, and isolate Kinshasa from its regional allies.
The intensity and firepower of the recent offensive on Minembwe strongly suggest that when Tshisekedi agreed to Angola’s ceasefire proposal, he had been assured that Banyamulenge resistance there would be broken and control of these strategic highlands and their airstrips secured before the ceasefire came into force.
From Kinshasa’s perspective, holding the highlands means better defence of Baraka and Uvira (both situated on the lowland coastal plain along Lake Tanganyika), as well as the possibility of eventually regaining footholds in Walungu and Kalehe, with Bukavu as the ultimate objective.
From the perspective of AFC/M23 and its ally Twirwaneho, controlling the highlands protects the Banyamulenge and preserves the option to strike these two cities, or even three, if Kalemie is included, at a time of their choosing. This creates a powerful military and psychological advantage over an adversary confined to the lowlands, with only the lake as a potential escape route should defensive lines collapse.
In short, with both sides still manoeuvring for decisive advantage, there is little genuine appetite for a truce at present.
Where does this leave us?
If a ceasefire leading to lasting peace is truly the objective, several changes are essential.
First, we all must recognise that parties to a conflict cannot also serve as judge, jury, and executioner. Burundi currently chairs the African Union, while the DRC sits on both the UN Security Council and the AU Peace and Security Council. Without safeguards, this arrangement compromises the ability of these institutions to take principled decisions in favour of de-escalation.
The AU’s hostile stance towards AFC/M23’s attempts to neutralise Kinshasa’s drone attacks on civilians, and MONUSCO’s entanglement with FARDC despite its alliances with the very armed groups it was mandated to dismantle, are stark illustrations of institutional failure to insulate decision-making from Kinshasa’s influence. This must change.
Second, mediators would do well to emulate Qatar’s fairness and refusal to be co-opted by either side. The management of the Doha process has been so measured and professional that Kinshasa has struggled to articulate any credible complaint, choosing instead to withdraw quietly.
Third and finally, a verification mechanism is indispensable to any meaningful ceasefire. Without it, we are left with accusation and counter-accusation amplified by a deeply biased media landscape. This makes it impossible to establish responsibility for violations, as seen in the escalation that led to the fall of Uvira, and, crucially, prevents accountability and targeted pressure where it matters.
Again, none of this should be controversial if international and regional actors were guided by a truth-seeking, evidence-based approach rather than personal interests and geopolitical calculations, and the pre-written scripts assigning blame for Congo’s crisis.
