For ten consecutive months, Sudan has been engulfed in a civil war with no end in sight. This conflict has spiralled into a severe humanitarian crisis, with Sudan becoming the epicentre of the world’s largest internal displacement crisis. The situation is dire, with nearly 60% of Sudanese requiring urgent food assistance. Yet, the war continues unabated. In a worrying development, Sudan’s historical allies, namely Iran, Eritrea and the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), may step in to support the beleaguered Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) against the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) and further internationalize a conflict in which the main protagonists face legitimacy issues and seem unable to settle their disputes peacefully.
Military dynamics
The primary conflict is between the SAF (which is led by General Abdel Fattah Al-Burhan), and the RSF which is led by General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, aka Hemedti). In the last few months, the SAF has suffered several military setbacks in key regions, such as the capital city, Khartoum. These losses, which include vital military camps, have led to a significant decrease in morale, as well as causing them a strategic disadvantage. A pivotal moment was the RSF’s capture of Wad Medeni on 19 December last year – a critical logistical and agricultural hub – which signalled a potential shift in power dynamics within Sudan. This victory has given the RSF the ability to expand their operations, particularly in the southern regions.
In response, the SAF, bolstered by Islamist militia alliances, has initiated civilian mobilization to counter RSF’s advancing forces. Notably, Islamist leaders, who were once imprisoned and later freed early in the conflict, are now operating under SAF protection. To make matters worse, several local armed and tribal groups have also become involved in the conflict on one side or the other, as the war drags on. Moreover, other countries have supported different sides in the conflict. For instance, it has been reported that the United Arab Emirates (UAE) supports the RSF, while Egypt supports the SAF. But recent military support from Iran, including arms shipments and intelligence, has enabled the SAF to launch an offensive, particularly in Omdurman, reclaiming control of some areas.
SAF’s and RSF’s legitimacy issues
The leadership of Al Burhan and SAF face significant legitimacy issues deeply rooted in the country’s history and the aftermath of President Omer Al Bashir’s ousting in April 2019. Despite Bashir’s removal, the pre-existing structures of the military and security forces remained largely unchanged, posing challenges to Sudan’s transition towards civilian rule. This situation deteriorated into a coup in October 2021 which disrupted the power dynamics within the civilian-military coalition government and eroded popular support for the military.
The SAF’s internal dynamics also contribute to this loss of legitimacy. They have an unclear hierarchy – a situation which fuels tensions and divisions between Islamist factions and military figures. This complexity is worsened by the SAF’s territorial losses to the RSF, which led to the arming of civilians through “Defence Committees,” a strategy reminiscent of the tactics of Bashir’s era.
The credibility of Al Burhan’s leadership is further undermined by contradicting messages from his side and, particularly from the Islamist-leaning Ministry of Foreign Affairs regarding mediation efforts. Al Burhan’s indecisive stance on international diplomacy and his reticence in diplomatic interactions underscore the challenges associated with his leadership. The 2021 coup significantly diminished his legitimacy, rendering the Sovereignty Council ineffective. In fact, several members have left the Council in protest against the coup. Today, the RSF’s rebellion has now confined its influence to Eastern Sudan and a few other military bases.
Furthermore, the SAF’s attacks on civilians and its engagement in infrastructure destruction, along with allegations of ethnic-based detentions, torture of civilians from western Sudan, and suppression of peace advocates, accentuate their legitimacy crisis. This approach of categorizing individuals as either allies or enemies is one of the biggest obstacles to Sudan’s path to peace and stability.
On the other hand, taking advantage of the SAF’s troubles, the RSF has positioned itself as a champion for dismantling the elite-controlled structure of Sudan, which was established in 1956. It advocates a new federal system that ensures the equitable distribution of power and resources. However, despite claiming to represent marginalized communities, its legitimacy is under scrutiny, especially given that it is based in Darfur, where the RSF and its affiliates have perpetrated ethnic violence, particularly against the Massalit tribe. Its claim to legitimacy is undermined by accusations of looting, home occupations, sexual violence, and widespread destruction of property, prompting a mass exodus from areas under its control, such as Medeni. Its image as a tribal-family paramilitary group contrasts with its commitment to peace talks and the agreement it signed with the Coordination Body of the Civic Democratic Forces (Tagadum), stating its determination to end the war and form a civilian-led democratic rule. This contrast raises questions about the genuineness of its intentions and its capacity for reform and governance.
The Iranian connection
While an increasing number of internal actors continue to compound the civil war, the conflict has also drawn increased involvement from external actors, which adds to the complexity of the situation. Initially, Egypt provided support to the SAF, but this support has waned due to the Gaza conflict and domestic economic challenges. Consequently, Sudan has turned to historical allies from the era of Omer Al Bashir, seeking assistance from Iran, Eritrea, and the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), among others.
Historical connections with Iran, dating back to the civilian government of Al Sadiq Al Mahdi and solidified under Bashir’s Islamist regime, were based on shared Islamic revolutionary ideals despite Sudan’s Sunni majority and Iran’s Shia majority. This relationship blossomed into military and political cooperation to the extent that Sudan faced accusations from Israel of facilitating Iranian arms shipments to Palestinian militants, leading to Israeli airstrikes in Sudan in 2009 and 2014, ostensibly aimed at disrupting these operations.
By 2014, the relationship between the two countries became strained, with Sudan closing Iranian cultural centres over allegations that they were spreading Shiism. Sudan then chose to align with Iran’s historical rival, Saudi Arabia, and participated in the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen from 2015 to 2021, contributing a significant troop presence and receiving substantial financial support in return, reportedly $2.2 billion. This shift in alliance and the military involvement in Yemen were seen as driven by economic needs and geopolitical pressures, especially since the U.S. sanctions imposed in 1997 were only lifted in 2017. Sudan sought to alleviate economic strains through alliances with Gulf Arab states close to the U.S. Today, as the war rages on, the Al-Burhan-led SAF appears to be willing to restore military cooperation with Iran.
The Eritrean-Tigrayan Dimension
Invited by Ethiopia, Eritrea engaged in a deadly conflict with the TPLF and its Tigray Defence Forces (TDF) from 2020 to 2022. Today, these historical enemies might find themselves fighting on the same side.
Credible reports indicate that Eritrea, in collaboration with SAF, has been training approximately 2,000 youths from the Hadendawa, Beni Amer and Rashaida tribal groups in Eastern Sudan since late December of 2023. While they may prepare them for combat against the RSF if the need arises, the trainees indicate they are keen on defending their communities and express a desire to remain neutral in the conflict. Additionally and according to sources on the ground, around 700 youths recruited by Minni Arkoi Minnawi, Darfurian leader of the Sudan Liberation Army (SLA-Minnawi), from the Gedaref area are being trained in Eritrea. The future role of these trainees in the civil war remains uncertain.
Eritrea’s involvement in Sudan is not new. Historically, Sudan has been a support base for the liberation movements of Eritrea and Tigray, while Ethiopia supported the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) and its military wing, the SPLA, which later became the new regular army of South Sudan. In 1990, Eritrea’s EPLF sent forces to support Sudan’s government against the SPLA. Despite Isaias Afwerki’s opposition to Sudan’s Islamism leanings, he maintained a favourable relationship with Sudan’s former president Omer Al Bashir and the regime’s ideologue Hassan Al Turabi as long as they did not support Eritrean dissident groups. The fact that both countries were under US sanctions also formed a basis for their cooperation. Today, Eritrea’s support for the SAF is contingent on the evolving dynamics of the conflict or the threats posed to Eritrea by extremist groups within the SAF.
Credible sources indicate the presence of Tigrayan Defence Forces in the Gedaref area, potentially supporting the SAF against the RSF. During the Tigray conflict from 2020 to 2022, some TPLF fighters found refuge in Sudan, with the Sudanese military extending its protection to them. Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed raised concerns over the TPLF’s presence in Sudan and alleged connections with the Sudanese government during discussions on the Pretoria agreement. The TPLF delegation denied these allegations, asserting that their presence in Sudan was for the protection of Tigrayan refugees.
Historically, the TPLF had positive relations with Sudan under Omer Al Bashir. The TPLF’s historical collaboration with the Sudanese army, such as dislodging the SPLA from a key outpost in South Sudan in 1992, hints at possible support for the SAF against the RSF. Getachew Reda, the Chairman of the Tigray Interim Administration, disclosed in an interview that Tigray retains around 270,000 un-demobilized fighters. However, the extent of TPLF’s assistance might be constrained due to unresolved issues with Ethiopia’s federal government and internal disputes within its leadership.
The unlikely alliance between the Eritrean government and the TPLF, who are historically opposed to each other, would be aimed at preventing the emergence of an RSF-led regime that would potentially be Ethiopia’s ally. For instance, the collaboration between Eritrean and Tigrayan forces in securing the Kassala and Gedaref states could provide strategic relief to the SAF, enabling it to focus its resources on other conflict zones.
At any rate, these potential alliances, alongside Iranian support, could alter the course of the conflict. Despite marginal advances in Khartoum, which dislodged the RSF from some areas in Omdurman, the SAF still remains outperformed on the battlefield, raising the possibility of Sudan’s dismemberment.
Given these circumstances, therefore, there’s a pressing need for regional and international stakeholders to engage with civilian entities and combatants to resolve the conflict and alleviate the suffering of the populace.
